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The recent controversy regarding Argentina’s dragging debt litigation 
has revived the longstanding academic discussion about the need for plau-
sible solutions for those countries attempting to address their unsustainable 
debt burdens.1  The Argentinean crisis was exacerbated by a problem with 
a holdout creditor group, who effectively refused to accept the same debt 
write-down as other creditors in 2005 and 2010.  Instead, the group sought 
full payment of their claim through litigation in the New York courts, lead-
ing to a fresh default in 2014.2  While a multitude of issues came to light 
during the fifteen-year battle that included both in-court litigation and out-
of-court negotiations, perhaps one of the most salient lessons from these 
proceedings is that financial crises are not a thing of the past, and their 
specter can usher in profound consequences regarding countries’ economic 
and political stability.3   Moreover, the contentious nature of the Argentini-
an proceedings demonstrates the need for an institutionalized mechanism 
for those instances in which a government cannot realistically pay its debts.  
A better, more standardized debt resolution system could exist to preserve 
the rights of creditors and debtor countries alike.4 
 
 *  J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2016.  I would like to thank Professor Charles 
Mooney for his thoughtful guidance and feedback regarding this topic. 
 1 Bloomberg View, Editorial: Argentina’s Debt Deal Doesn’t Solve the Real Problem, NEW HAVEN REG. 
(Mar. 1, 2016) http://www.nhregister.com/opinion/20160301/editorial-argentinas-debt-deal-
doesnt-solve-the-real-problem. 
 2 Argentina’s Debt: At Last, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/-
americas/21693786-agreement-victory-countrys-new-president-argentina-reaches-deal-its. 
 3 See Alinna Arora & Rodrigo Olivares Caminal, Rethinking the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Approach, 9 
LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 629, 629 (discussing how in developing economies like Turkey and Argen-
tina, the predominance of government debt in international markets makes sovereign debt crises 
like Turkey and Argentina into economy-wide financial crises). 
 4 Id. at 631; see also The Associated Press, Argentina and a Group of U.S. Holdout Creditors Announce a Deal 
in a Longstanding Debt Standoff, Potentially Breaking an Impasse that Has Kept the South American Country on 
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Although in Argentina’s case the parties were able to eventually reach a 
resolution, the implications of a large-scale sovereign debt default in today’s 
interdependent international financial system pose a serious systemic threat.  
The mere prospect of these rippling consequences has already led to radical 
changes in how debt is issued worldwide.5  Indeed, in 2016 the Internation-
al Monetary Fund warned that if countries do not start acting in concert 
towards some kind of common goals, the global economy “could be de-
railed” and urged countries to move “urgently” and “collectively” to boost 
global growth prospects.6  Despite the cooperation urged by such state-
ments, widespread uncertainty and disagreements among countries persist, 
thus allowing uncertainty to loom over our increasingly globalized econo-
my.  As sovereign bonds become increasingly prevalent in the global capital 
markets, the potential for a single nation’s debt default to trigger a larger 
systemic collapse grows—mainly because as issuance of these bonds prolif-
erates, the economic dependency between countries likewise increases.7 
The contemporary Argentinian example and earlier crises in Greece 
and Ecuador are all evidence of the serious costs that accompany the cur-
rent inconsistent resolutions to sovereign debt processes.8  Unresolved sov-
ereign debt issues carry huge costs, and have at once caused financial and 
other damage to individual debtor nations, citizens, and creditors.9   When 
countries’ external debt exceeds sustainable levels and the borrower state is 
unable to service payments of principal and interest, there is no way for 
creditors to force repayment by these sovereign nations, since there is no 
legal framework under which to wind up a country, or seize and liquidate 
its domestically-held assets.10  As a result, in addition to the IMF’s state-
ments, there is a growing recognition within the sovereign debt markets for 
a more dependable approach to the risks accompanying potential default, 
and more specifically, for a mechanism that allows for consistency in sover-
 
the Margins of International Credit Markets, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 29, 2016) http://nyti.ms/1nbSph0; Ar-
gentina’s Debt: At Last, supra note 2. 
 5 Bloomberg View, supra note 1. 
 6 Ngaire Woods, The Global Economy’s Stealth Resilience, PROJECT SYNDICATE, (Mar. 3, 2016) 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/g-20-shanghai-meeting-distributed-
governance-by-ngaire-woods-2016-03. 
 7 Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical Comparison, 2 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 95, 97 (2012) (“As global capital markets increasingly (and inevitably) embrace sovereign 
bonds, the potential for a nation’s debt default to trigger a larger systemic collapse increases as 
these relationships become even more linked.”) 
 8 See Jack Boorman, Alternative Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 23 CATO J. 59, 59 (2003) (ar-
guing the extended process of bringing defaulted sovereign debt to resolution caused intolerable 
economic losses in Ecuador); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Model-Law 
Approach, J. GLOBALIZATION & DEV., 2 (2016) (enumerating mechanisms by which extended and 
uncertain insolvent sovereign debt resolution harms all stakeholders). 
 9 Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 2–3. 
 10 Jonathan Sedlak, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Statutory Reform or Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1483, 1487 (2004). 
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eign debt restructuring across nations.11  However, the international finan-
cial system currently offers no established framework for the predictable 
and orderly restructuring of sovereign debt, and the fact that debt is issued 
in different manners in different jurisdictions simply exacerbates the prob-
lem.12  As Boorman notes, “[i]n the view of many, however, the costs in-
curred under the current international financial architecture are unneces-
sarily large and act to the detriment of both debtors and their creditors.13 
There is clearly a need for change.  As a result of the inefficiencies of the 
current system and the increasing media and academic focus on these debt-
restructuring issues, Professor Steven A. Schwarcz, a leader in the study of 
sovereign debt and expert in the restructuring field, has recently crafted a 
forthcoming proposal for a statutory framework.14   His innovative statutory 
solution consists of a cross-jurisdictional model law.  This law, if adopted by 
at least two jurisdictions at a national or subnational level, would create 
what Schwarcz believes to be the most legally and practically feasible 
mechanism under which a sovereign debt restructuring could take place—
and due to the distribution of bondholders and governing law, his proposal 
suggests that the law would be most successful if the United States enacted 
it on a subnational level, through adoption in New York state.15 
Though his proposal exhibits many benefits, and would, if adopted, 
create a single comprehensive mechanism with which the international 
markets could cohesively approach sovereign debt, his proposal nonetheless 
raises some concerns with respect to its legal feasibility.  In particular, the 
law’s retroactive modification of creditors’ debt contracts, particularly those 
being acted upon at a subnational level, is arguably in violation of the fed-
eral Contracts Clause,16 a provision of the U.S. Constitution that prohibits 
states from enacting any legislation that impairs its citizens’ existing con-
tractual obligations.17  In exploring the question of constitutionality, the 
refutations and challenges contained in this paper are not meant to be criti-
 
 11 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING—RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK (Apr. 
26, 2013), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf.  “Sovereign debt restruc-
turing” is a term that refers to the processes that result in an adjustment of the principal amount 
of treasury obligations, and seek to make a country’s debt sustainable. Sedlak, supra note 10 at 
1491; see generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., United States Sovereign Debt: A Thought Experiment On De-
fault And Restructuring 2 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 14-40, 
2012) (discussing the unpredictable consequences of a hypothetical U.S. sovereign default). 
 12 Shalendra D. Sharma, Resolving Sovereign Debt: Collective Action Clauses or the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 627, 627 (2004). 
 13 Boorman, supra note 8, at 59. 
 14 See generally Schwarcz, supra note 7. 
 15 Id. at 11. 
 16 Alternatively, some literature refers to this clause as the “Contract Clause.”  This paper will, for 
convenience’s sake, refer to it consistently as the “Contracts Clause.” 
 17 U.S. CONST. art I, § 10. 
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cisms, as Schwarcz’s model law is one of the most compelling examples of a 
realistic, adaptable mechanism that could effect sovereign debt restructur-
ing.  However, this analysis seeks to show, through a historical approach, 
that as Contracts Clause jurisprudence has evolved, it likewise follows that 
the legal feasibility of such a law is perhaps less clean, and more open to 
criticism, than Schwarcz’s initial proposal contemplates. 
Part I of this paper will describe the legal and academic landscape sur-
rounding sovereign debt restructuring and the problems that currently limit 
the effectiveness of the contractual legal system.  Part II will delve into solu-
tions: specifically, it will explore Professor Schwarcz’s statutory proposal 
and explain the benefits of his model law, which is arguably one of the few 
mechanisms under which a cross-jurisdictional restructuring mechanism 
could actually be effected.  Part III will then address the constitutional is-
sues that this model law approach creates, and explore Contracts Clause 
jurisprudence to ascertain the law’s legal soundness.  Using the lessons of 
Part III, Part IV will address and refute the primary counterarguments that 
the staunchest proponents of the model law could raise—namely, that there 
is no mechanism with which creditors can challenge the law, and that a 
court should uphold the model law on policy grounds.  Part V, then, will 
propose alternative policy strands that could be incorporated into the law, 
and move towards a solution that could limit the unlimited universe of 
creditors with standing, which may make the law a more legally appealing, 
and constitutional, option. 
I.  SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: CURRENT PROBLEMS AND 
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A sovereign debt restructuring differs from a typical corporate restruc-
turing in several key ways.  Perhaps most notably, institutionalized mecha-
nisms exist for the distribution of assets in a private corporate scenario, in 
which creditors can force an insolvent corporation to liquidate and convey 
its assets through the procedures of a bankruptcy court or other tribunal.18   
And although some U.S. entities at the municipal level have special provi-
sions for reorganization, a relatively tidy liquidation option, at the current 
time, is unavailable when the debtor is sovereign at either a national or 
subnational level.19  Further, the goal of a sovereign debt restructuring is 
 
 18 Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuting: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 956, 957–58 (2000). 
 19 With regard to a subnational bankruptcy, some politicians and academics, including Schwarcz 
and David Skeel, have suggested that Congress should extend federal bankruptcy regimes to the 
states, but even in such a case it would likely not bring about a liquidation under Chapter 7 (as 
practically speaking, this seems implausible), but would likely take more of the flavor of a reor-
ganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, or an extension of Chapter 9 (which co-
vers municipal bankruptcies).  See David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 
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only reorganization of the debt, and the safety valve of liquidation is not an 
exit option for a debtor state, even those in the most inherently “bad” fi-
nancial situations.20  Beginning in the 1980s and continuing into the twenty 
first century, there has been a rise in the number of debtor countries seek-
ing relief for debt burdens, and among these parties are some of the largest 
debtors worldwide—yet “[s]overeign debt restructuring is a problem that 
has been ignored for quite some time”21 despite the earlier discussed inte-
gration of global markets and accompanying criticisms of bailouts.22 
Practically speaking, if a sovereign debtor shows itself willing to meet its 
debts when it becomes possible, it is in the interests of all the creditors to 
maintain their relationship with the debtor-state and negotiate a workable 
solution.  Like a bankruptcy-based reorganization, in which agreement on a 
plan is rewarded while failure to agree is penalized, the most efficient forms 
of sovereign debt restructuring are those that are consensual.23  That said, 
reaching this consensus is a “haphazard affair.”24  Achievement of those 
consensual aspects of a plan is often undermined by the parties’ interests: 
the debtor-state and its creditors necessarily are in conflict, which often 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for these two parties to reach agreement 
on a single restructuring plan, let alone which legal framework to apply.25  
Beyond this, there are often intercreditor disagreements, which signal an-
other problem that can arise at virtually any stage of a restructuring and 
derail the process.26 
Although the advocacy and involvement of the International Monetary 
Fund is importantly symbolically, as it is a multilateral government entity 
attempting to aid in the process of sovereign debt restructuring, its in-
volvement has only further complicated the situation.  A bailout by the 
IMF is one mechanism with which a distressed company can find relief,27 
but this solution remains controversial because in bailouts the Fund is act-
ing as “a lender of last resort” to financially troubled states.28  The IMF’s 
 
694 (2012); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State ‘Bankruptcy’, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 322, 325–26 (2011). 
 20 Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 959, n.7 (noting that no conversion similar to that in a corporate 
bankruptcy is within the realm of consideration for a sovereign restructuring) (citing Sachs, infra 
note 31). 
 21 Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1514. 
 22 See Graeme F. Rea, Restructuring Sovereign Debt—Will There be New International Law and Institutions?, 
77 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 312 (1983) (describing the ad hoc processes and complications of 
stabilizing insolvent governments). 
 23 Id. at 312. 
 24 Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 959 
 25 Id. at 959–60. 
 26 For instance, see the holdout problem that exists within the Collective Action Clause solution to 
restructuring, supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 27 Arora & Caminal, supra note 3, at 630. 
 28 Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 961. 
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lending practice has created what has been labeled a risk of “moral haz-
ard,” a scenario in which countries hoping for an IMF bailout will fail to 
undertake a prudent economic course, as they will be protected from de-
fault and thus can engage in unwarranted financial risk without any mean-
ingful oversight.29  Though the IMF has imposed conditions of fiscal respon-
sibility through lending practices (mainly through an approach known as 
“conditionality”) such attempts to alleviate moral hazard sometimes fail, 
and the problem persists.30   In a criticism of the IMF’s role in debt 
workouts, and in recommending an overhaul of its lending practices, Jeffrey 
Sachs states “[t]he IMF’s own tactics—and failure to act like a bankruptcy 
manager—help to breed failures.”31 
Currently, uncertainty surrounds every aspect of the sovereign debt re-
structuring process.32  As the above debates show, restructuring sovereign 
debt is a difficult subject, one that is open to criticism on multiple fronts and 
presents several layered political and social questions.  Some such questions 
include: At what point does a country decide that its debt is unsustainable?  
Once it does reach this conclusion, why is any one particular mechanism 
the proper one to restructure that debt?  What parties have a stake in the 
proceedings, and how involved should the official international community 
be in the eventual restructuring?33  And while “[d]ebt can almost always be 
serviced in some abstract sense, through additional taxation and through 
the diversion of yet more domestic production to exports to generate the 
revenue and foreign exchange needed to service the debt,” there is a 
threshold question regarding whether a large-scale debt restructuring is ev-
er appropriate, as well as what parties should be able to force, or prevent, 
the restructuring’s results.34  Further, a debtor state’s decision is even more 
complicated by the fact that it cannot restructure its debt completely unilat-
erally without suffering “reputational cost in the world financial communi-
ty.”35  Resulting from these political uncertainties is the need for the debt 
servicing mechanism to be effective in not only restructuring the debt, but 
to also to garner the support and endorsement of the international commu-
nity.  This approval necessarily includes that of the International Monetary 
 
 29 Id. at 962. 
 30 Id. at 963. 
 31 Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1995, Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?, Princeton University Frank 
D. Graham Lecture (Apr. 20, 1995), http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:8279. 
 32 Arora & Caminal, supra note 3, at 630. 
 33 Boorman, supra note 8, at 60. 
 34 Id. at 61. 
 35 Steven L. Schwarcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1192 (2004); 
Sachs,supra note 31; see also Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 101 (recognizing unilateral debt reorganiza-
tion as an alternative to bilateral debt restructuring, but noting that “[t]he nation may well suffer 
reputational consequences, and any national assets (such as ships or airplanes) outside the na-
tion’s jurisprudence might be able to be seized.”) 
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Fund, who will likely still need to commit resources to continue to assist the 
debtor country, regardless of the Fund’s own role in complicity allowing 
governments to remain in financial distress.36 
Because the current system lacks consistency and cohesion, academics 
have debated what resolution framework is the best mechanism to institu-
tionalize widely and consistently, and there is, remarkably, “widespread 
agreement for a revamped sovereign debt restructuring process.”37  Though 
some radical mechanisms and discussions exist, and have ranged from strict 
court-supervised international bankruptcy regimes,38 to systems modeled on 
railroad receiverships,39 to even more freewheeling, completely decentral-
ized approaches,40 the primary academic debate centers on either adopting 
a cross-border regime of either a contractual or a statutory nature.  This di-
vide is sometimes identified as a difference drawn between public law, 
which is embodied through a statutory approach that would require 
agreement across states, versus the private law solutions, which could be 
undertaken unilaterally, and take the form of individual collective action 
clauses.41 
The private law solution to address sovereign debt restructuring is con-
tractual, and treats each issuance of debt as its own distinct contract and, 
therefore, subject to its own terms.  This approach provides a certain pro-
cess to restructure debt, the lack of which currently prevents investors from 
adequately assessing the cost of default.42  Often, issued debt instruments 
contain collective action clauses, or CACs.  The CAC approach is de-
scribed as “voluntary and market based” and is contingent on the inclusion 
of these various clauses in individual bond instruments, leaving jurisdiction 
to the courts in which the instrument was issued.43  Proponents of this con-
tractual approach often extol the virtues of market-based solutions, and pol-
icy proposals in this arena encourage creditors and debtors to actively en-
 
 36 Boorman supra note 8, at 61. 
 37 Arora & Caminal, supra note 3, at 631. 
 38 Jeffrey Sachs proposed an international bankruptcy regime modeled on Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy code to provide insolvent countries the same protection from creditors as private 
firm. See Sharma, supra note 12, at 628. 
 39 See generally Stephen J. Lubben, Out of the Past: Railroads & Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 35 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 845, 845–46 (2004) (suggesting many analogies and parallels between the options for 
bankruptcy proceedings for railroads and sovereign nations, since both structures operate in the 
absence of a statutory framework and do not have a liquidation as an exit option, a railroad re-
ceivership proceeding could plausibly be adapted for a sovereign nation with certain limitations.) 
 40 See Arora & Caminal, supra note 3, at 649 (detailing a CAC-modifying proposal by the U.S. Un-
dersecretary John B. Taylor). 
 41 Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 1190. 
 42 Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1499 (“With no process in place, investors are unable to adequately as-
sess the cost of default.  Without this information, not only are bonds priced inaccurately, but 
great uncertainty ensues when a country has debts that are unmanagemeable.”) 
 43 Boorman, supra note 8, at 65. 
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gage in altering the terms under which countries borrow money.44  Sug-
gested mechanisms for improvement of this system would allow for the 
broadening of the use of these CACs in order to allow the holders of the 
debt to understand more clearly its relationship with the debtor for the re-
structuring of those claims.45  Further, some proposals contain initiation 
and engagement clauses, which are designed to attack the minority holdout 
problem and uncertainties about procedure.46  The traditional form of a 
CAC provides for majority enforcement and majority restructuring provi-
sions, which have been in use for some time, and have received attention as 
being likely to deserve wider use.47 
In this system, however, there is a collective action problem that has 
worsened significantly among creditors as debtor states have begun borrow-
ing more money from bond investors.48  This has led to the holdout prob-
lem discussed earlier with respect to Argentina: when facing a plan of reor-
ganization, one or more creditor groups can prevent a consensual plan 
from being reached in the hope that the need to reach an agreement be-
comes so powerful that other parties will buy out the holdout claims or pay 
them a premium.49  U.S. Courts have even recognized, in some instances, 
that such behavior is permissible in the sovereign debt context.50  There-
fore, at each stage of a contractual sovereign debt restructuring, problems 
plague the readjustment of debt claims to the detriment of the non-holdout 
creditors as well as the debtor.51 
There is a current movement towards better formulated, more viable 
steps that address these problems, such as when contingency clauses are 
added, which could aggregate creditor claims for voting purposes, or au-
thorize a trustee of a bondholder syndicate to act as a representative in a 
restructuring.52  However, little progress has come out of these ambitious 
initiatives, and any continued efforts largely appear to mimic the effects and 
role of a statutory solution to the problem.  Although the consistent inclu-
sion of such clauses would be an improvement over the state of affairs, 
there is a question whether this approach even goes far enough in effecting 
an orderly restructuring, especially because of the lack of uniformity of lan-
 
 44 Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1498. 
 45 Boorman, supra note 8, at 60. 
 46 Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1500. 
 47 Boorman, supra note 8, at 65. 
 48 Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 960. 
 49 Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 98. 
 50 Id. (citing the opinion in Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d 
Cir. 1985), in which a member of a bank syndicate held out in an agreement with Costa Rican 
sovereign debtors and the court granted summary judgment on the theory that the loan was 
clearly due and payable). 
 51 Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 961. 
 52 See Boorman, supra note 8, at 65, 67 (describing the movement towards more ambitious contin-
gency clauses). 
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guage across jurisdictions and bond instruments.53  It should be noted that 
restructurings in Ecuador and the Ukraine demonstrated that a restructur-
ing is possible under this voluntary contractual agreement system.54 
II.  ONE STATUTORY APPROACH: A MODEL LAW AS A MEANS TO 
RESTRUCTURE SOVEREIGN DEBT 
As a result of these collective action problems presented by the contrac-
tual approach, numerous parties, including the IMF, have voiced support 
for some statutory creation that would function like a consistent, interna-
tional bankruptcy regime.55  Generally speaking, a well-designed statutory 
solution is largely preferable to a contractual one.  A statutory solution 
would allow a sovereign the ability to bind its minority creditors under the 
power of law, thereby addressing the holdout problem and enabling the 
debtor-states to restructure debt free of this concern.56  Thus, the desire to 
reduce the social costs of sovereign debt has led toward a movement pursu-
ing a systematic legal resolution framework, one that takes the form of a 
cross-jurisdictional statute that can help debtor states restructure unsustain-
able sovereign debt.57 
Once-IMF Director Anne Kreuger stated, in a proposal for a sovereign 
debt restructuring mechanism, that the most important element of any new 
restructuring framework would be a mechanism to allow a qualified majori-
ty of creditors to bind minority creditors.58  The IMF proposed its own 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, one that was formally designed 
to move away from the messy contractual approach and instead organize 
creditors and countries in an effort to restructure their debt in an orderly 
and timely manner,59 but the idea never gained traction and has been 
largely abandoned.60  As a result, the contractual, market based approach 
has become the status quo, though calls for a formal restructuring mecha-
 
 53 Boorman, supra note 8, at 65–67. 
 54 Arora & Caminal, supra note 3, at 637. 
 55 Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1491; Bloomberg View, supra note 1; see also Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A 
Framework for a Formal Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: The KISS Principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid) 
and Other Guiding Principles,  37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 57, 60 (2015)(discussing the continued need for a 
formal restructuring mechanism notwithstanding the rejection of the IMF’s SDRM proposal and 
widespread use and acceptance of CACs). 
 56 Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1493–94. 
 57 Richard Gitlin & Brett House, A Blueprint for a Sovereign Debt Forum, 27 CIGI PAPERS 5, 5 (2014). 
 58 Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1494 (quoting Anne O. Kreuger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restruc-
turing, Int’l Monetary Fund, at 14 (2002), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf at 2 (internal quotes omitted)). 
 59 See Arora, supra note 3, at 633. 
 60 Mooney, supra note 55, at 58 (“The proposal received support, but was eventually abandoned” 
citing its reasons for its abandonment as, inter alia, the opposition of the United States and the 
private sector). 
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nism have not ceased, and have, in light of the Eurozone crisis, actually re-
surged.61 
In response to recent financial crises, a similar, contemporary proposal 
comes from Professor Steven L. Schwarcz: across borders, states would 
adopt a model law to achieve a voluntary resolution framework within their 
jurisdictions.62  Such an approach, he argues, would reduce the need for 
sovereign debt bailouts by organizations like the IMF, which he calls “cost-
ly” and the main cause of the aforementioned “moral hazard” issue.63  Fur-
ther, Schwarcz claims that a model law approach would “reduce the risk of 
systemic contagion” from a debtor-state’s default, an important goal in to-
day’s interdependent financial system.64 
Schwarcz arrived at this statutory approach after observing the system 
of CACs, which he labels a  “deeply dysfunctional” approach that “produc-
es bad law,”65 and noting that the more sustainable and consistent model 
laws are not unprecedented in cross-jurisdictional lawmaking.66  His pro-
posal points out how CACs are insufficient to solve the holdout problem, as 
many sovereign debt contracts lack them, and still require unanimity to ef-
fect a restructuring.67  Further, even in those contracts that contain CACs, 
the requirements are so high that the holdouts come about in another fash-
ion, and such contracts are only binding to the contract parties.68  In sum, 
radically improved CACs, such as those proposed by the International 
Capital Market Association in August 2014, are insufficient to address the 
immediacy of the problem at hand.69 
It is at this point in his proposal that Schwarcz asserts that a model law 
would be the preferable approach, since each participating government will 
adopt the law and take its own individual requisite steps to make it effective, 
 
 61 Mooney, supra note 55,  at 60. 
 62 Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 6. 
 63 Id. at 4–5. 
 64 Id. at 5. 
 65 Id. at 3. 
 66 Id. at 6. Schwarcz cites, as precedent, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration as an example of an international insolvency law, while the Uniform Commercial 
Code is an example of a subnational model law that was uniformly enacted on a multi-state level.  
See also United Nations, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
(1985, with amendments as adopted in 2006), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/-
texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf (establishing a model law regularizing arbitration 
as a method of settling disputes in the international commercial markets). 
 67 Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 3. 
 68 Id. (“Even in sovereign debt contracts that include CACs, the supermajority requirement may be 
so high (e.g. three-quarters) that vulture funds are able to purchase vote-blocking positions that 
enable them to act as holdouts”). 
 69 See id. at 4 (“Even if all new sovereign debt contracts were to include aggregate-voting CACs, it 
will be many years before existing debt contracts, which do not include them, are paid off.”) 
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while still adhering to the same, or close to the same legislative text.70  As 
opposed to a convention, a model law permits the texts of the laws to vary, 
while also allowing any enacted laws to be amended by member states uni-
laterally if the need so arises.71  For this reason, a model law approach is ar-
guably preferable to adhering to a convention, which is a legal tool that is 
legally very similar to a cross-border treaty.  Though a convention would 
similarly require each member state to adhere to its requirements, and in 
most cases are preferable to model laws because they are binding upon the 
nations, who cannot renege on their agreements,72 such certainty is less 
preferable in the current instance.  In most situations in which a country is 
experimenting with new proposals,73 model laws can have broad ac-
ceptance and tweaks that a strict convention does not allow, and if a state 
wants to modify or denounce a model law, it can do so on a smaller state or 
subnational level, which would not violate international law.74 
The structure of Schwarcz’s model law is meant to provide effective 
mechanisms for a restructuring while reducing the social costs of a debt cri-
sis, systemic risk, creditor uncertainty, and the need for bailouts.75  He 
achieves this though applying the law retroactively and overriding any con-
tractual provisions inconsistent with “any contractual provisions that are 
inconsistent with the provisions of this [l]aw.”76  The law is invoked by vol-
untary petition, and immediately notifies all creditors of the state’s intention 
to negotiate a plan.77  The law outlines a binding voting structure in its 
Chapter III, Article 778 as well as terms of Lending and a Priority Scheme 
in its Chapter IV, Articles 8 and 9.79  All disputes under the law are re-
solved by binding arbitration through an international court.80 
 
 70 See Schwarcz, supra note 18, (noting that Professor Schwarcz has alternatively argued for the 
adoption of an international convention in 1999–2000); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Idiot’s Guide to 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring 53 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1192 (2004) (concluding that a statutory approach 
is the most preferable and effective way of effecting a restructuring in); see also Schwarcz, supra 
note 7, at 97 (suggesting that the model approach is the next line of scholarship for Schwarcz). 
 71 Charles W. Mooney, Jr., “Extraterritorial Impact of Choice of Law Rules for Non-United States 
Debtors Under Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 and a New Proposal for Interna-
tional Harmonization,” in CROSS-BORDER SECURITY AND INSOLVENCY (Michael Bridge & 
Robert Stevens eds., Oxford University Press 2001). 
 72 Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 6–7. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See Mooney, supra note 71, at 202. 
 75 Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 13. 
 76 Id. at 24, 35. 
 77 Id. at 36. 
 78 See id. at 37 (“A class of claims has agreed to a Plan if creditors holding at least [two-thirds] in 
amount and more than [one-half] in number of the claims of such class [voting on such Plan] 
[entitled to vote of such Plan] agree to the Plan,” noting how selecting those actually voting on 
the plan can more easily lead to Plan approval). 
 79 Id. at 38 (“Subject to Article 8(3), the State shall have the right to borrow money on such terms 
and conditions as it deems appropriate”; “The State shall repay loans approved under Article 8 
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Rather than advocating for large-scale, multi-member adoption of his 
model law, Schwarcz instead proposes the enactment to be limited to one 
or two jurisdictions.81  More specifically, because either New York or Eng-
lish law governs most sovereign debt contracts, Schwarcz believes one or 
both of those jurisdictions should adopt his model law, with one state’s 
adoption incentivizing the other to similarly adopt.82 
III.  THE LEGAL FEASIBILITY OF THIS MODEL LAW APPROACH 
In his proposal, Schwarcz maintains that even despite the retroactive 
application of the model law, it is nonetheless within the scope of legal fea-
sibility—because it rests its constitutionality on an exercise of New York’s 
police powers, its retroactive features would be constitutionally justified.83  
Looking to precedent, the Model Law cleanly relies on the Supreme 
Court’s 1934 decision Home Building & Loan v. Blaisdell, an opinion that does 
indeed speak of the legal standard that upholds otherwise unconstitutional 
acts in the name of the police power.84  Schwarcz claims that the state of 
New York could effectively frame its law to meet the five factor test the 
Court first recognized in Blaisdell, which allowed the law in that instance to 
survive a Contracts Clause challenge.85  As he states, any law enacted as an 
exercise of a state’s police powers would have to (1) address a grave tempo-
rary economic emergency, (2) protect a basis societal interest, not a favored 
group, (3) provide relief—in the form of supermajority aggregate voting for 
debt relief and temporary funding—that is appropriately tailored to the 
emergency it is enacted to address, (4) impose reasonable conditions, and 
(5) be limited in its application to the duration of the economic emergen-
cy.86  Schwarcz also says that “[m]ore recent jurisprudence suggests [that] 
even more leeway” could be granted to laws that normally would be subject 
to a Contracts Clause challenge,87 and that such leeway granted may be 
even greater if the constitutional impairment is “not substantial.”88 
 
prior to paying any other claims. . . . The claims of creditors of the State are subordinated to the 
extent needed to effectuate the priority payment under this Article 9.”) 
 80 See id. (“All disputes under this Law shall be resolved by binding arbitration before a panel of 
three arbitrators.”) 
 81 Id. at 5. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 5, 25–26 n.137–38 and accompanying text (“Such a statute would survive a Contracts 
Clause challenge if it . . . [he then lists the Blaisdell factors]”). 
 84 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 85 Id. at 444–47. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 26 n.133 (citing Healthnow N.Y. Inc. v. N.Y. State Ins. Dept., 110 
A.D. 3d 1216, 1217 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2013) (noting that “this case, however, is a state 
court decision.”)) 
 88 Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 26 n.134 (citing Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 
U.S. 400, 411 (1983)). 
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On this foundation, Schwarcz states “New York . . . should be able to 
frame its enactment of the [m]odel [l]aw in such a way as to not violate the 
Contracts Clause” and it therefore should meet the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
criteria to survive a Contracts Clause challenge.89  The questions about the 
law’s legal feasibility, however, do not end here.  Although Schwarcz is cor-
rect in recognizing that the Supreme Court rejected a Contracts Clause 
challenge in Blaisdell in part on account of the economic emergency posed 
by the Depression, courts seem likely to treat invocations of emergency 
more skeptically when made in service to the state’s own self-interest.90  
And although it is indeed possible his law may comport with the emergency 
powers doctrine presented in Blaisdell, the narrowness of the exception may 
yet undermine his law’s feasibility.  Further, a historical survey of Contracts 
Clause jurisprudence shows how challenges to the Clause, and exceptions 
found, rarely predictably align with precedent, and instead are highly sub-
ject to the social climate under which the challenge is raised.  In addition, 
there is a question as to whether a state even has the ability to enact a sub-
national insolvency law, or whether the evolution of the Bankruptcy Clause 
would redistribute such power elsewhere. 
A.  Blaisdell and Emergency Powers Exception 
The model law’s clean reliance on the Blaisdell factor understates the 
complexity of the constitutional legal landscape that would allow a state law 
to be immune from a Contracts Clause challenge, and fails to mention the 
accompanying heightened judicial scrutiny that the state, in enacting a self-
serving model law, would realistically receive.  Further, the law’s reliance 
on solely the Blaisdell case understates the illusive nature of the opinion and 
the uncertainties it contained, as “[m]any scholars consider [Blaisdell] an 
aberration in Contract[s] Clause jurisprudence and contend its emphasis 
upon flexible judicial interpretation and the wide latitude of state police 
powers undermined the security of vested contract rights.”91  Of particular 
concern is the Model Law’s retroactivity, which Schwarcz himself notes 
that this could raise an enforceability concern under domestic subnational 
law,92 noting how this particular feature of the law could render it as being 
a violation of the Contracts Clause. 
At the time Blaisdell bubbled up to the courts, Franklin Delano Roose-
velt was president, over four thousand banks had failed, the national in-
 
 89 Id. at 25. 
 90 Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL. 117, 134 (2012). 
 91 Samuel R. Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision: A Historical Study of contract Clause 
Jurisprudence, 72 OR. L. REV. 513, 515 (1993). 
 92 Schwarcz, supra  note 8, at 25. 
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come had been halved, over a quarter of the work force was idle, and all 
areas of the economy were close to failure.93  In response to the wave of 
farm foreclosures that this economic state entailed, Minnesota passed a law 
under which mortgagers who were unable to make their payments were 
permitted to turn to state courts to alter their payment schedules.94  The 
economic climate was highly uncertain, and the need for some kind of fi-
nancial act was become all the more apparent. 
Contextualism, then, is the basic premise underlying the Blaisdell deci-
sion.  Justice Hughes’ majority opinion reveals that that the constitutional 
provision in question should be interpreted not in the abstract, but both 
within “the context of the entire Constitution,” as well as that of “the social 
situation confronting the Court”—in other words, the same constitutional 
provisions “may mandate different results in similar cases arising at differ-
ent points in history.”95  As a result, the text of the Blaisdell opinion is highly 
suggestive that the case was decided wholly within the tumultuous econom-
ic and social climate under which it arose, with Hughes stating, 
“[e]mergency does not create power.  Emergency does not increase granted 
power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted 
or reserved,” and that an emergency may justify the use, even if not the exist-
ence of the police power.96  The Great Depression (the “emergency” Hughes 
was alluding to) served as the grounds under which the opinion rests.  
Though Hughes also recognizes that the law in question is exactly the kind 
of law that the Contracts Clause, and framers sought to prevent,97 his hold-
ing nonetheless expressed the belief that some degree of impairment was 
nonetheless constitutionally permissible.  And indeed, the ability for the 
court to exercise any emergency power, “thus transcending the carefully 
crafted textual boundaries emplaced on government actors, is [likely] im-
plicit within the structure of the Constitution.”98  Because precedent was 
not “directly applicable to the question” before the court “in view of the 
conditions with which the Minnesota statute seeks to safeguard the interests 
of the mortgagee-purchaser,” the Court instead looked to cases under 
which the economic interests of the state “may justify the exercise of its con-
tinuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with 
contracts.”99 
 
 93 Rebecca M. Kahan, Constitutional Stretch, Snap-Back, & Sag: Why Blaisdell was a Harsher Blow to Lib-
erty than Korematsu, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1279, 1302 (2005). 
 94 Charles A. Bieneman, Note, Legal Interpretation and a Constitutional Case: Home Building & Loan 
Association v. Blaisdell, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2534, 2537 (1992). 
 95 Id. at 2534. 
 96 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425–26 (1934). 
 97 Id. at 428–29. 
 98 Kahan, supra note 93, at 1286. 
 99 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434, 437. 
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Some scholarship argues that Blaisdell’s interpretation of the Contracts 
Clause is legally baseless, and was instead applied only due to the “[s]trong 
social pressures to uphold the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium [that] un-
deniably existed.”100  Minnesota’s law was intended to give creditors what 
the mortgagors could pay, and did not wholly abrogate (even if it did im-
pair) the mortgagors’ obligation on the contract.  However, the finely-
worded Contracts Clause leaves no gap in interpretation to shoehorn this 
policy perspective in—“[w]ere the clause vague or ambiguous, a Court 
might find gaps allowing it interpretive leeway.”101  This reading of Blaisdell 
suggests that the Contracts Clause paid little to no attention to the positive 
law at the time, and was therefore exclusively appropriate for the mortgag-
ors and creditors in the Great Depression, but likely should not be widely 
applicable in other contexts. 
Clearly, the list of factors that the court set out is evidence of efforts to 
narrowly construe the Blaisdell opinion.102  The state’s action “must be lim-
ited by reasonable conditions appropriate to the emergency”103 and the re-
lief “must have reasonable relation to the legitimate end to which the State 
is entitled to direct its legislation,”104 and such relief would be considered 
unconstitutional if it was “neither temporary nor conditional” and con-
tained “no limitations as to time, amount, circumstances, or need.”105 
The Court has allowed for this emergency exception for regulations that 
are needed to preserve “what is best for the body politic in the long run” 
and such benefits can “prevail over the interests of particular individu-
als.”106  And though it is true that the Supreme Court has at times granted 
inalienable police powers an expansive interpretation, it is not certain that 
such leeway would be similarly given to those regulations simply meant to 
relieve a state from its own economic debt, especially if, as Justice Suther-
land claims in his dissent to Blaisdell, the Contracts Clause serves the “stud-
ied purpose of preventing legislation designed to relieve debtors especially in 
time of distress”107  Blaisdell did not address whether economic interests are 
included in the powers protecting the public welfare, though the Court did 
explicitly state that the state’s reserved powers could not be construed to al-
low a state to repudiate its debts.108   Moreover, there is some skepticism 
 
100 Bieneman, supra note 94, at 2561. 
101 Id. at 2563. 
102 Olken, supra note 91, at 595. (“As a whole, these cases demonstrate the perception of the Chief 
Justice and other members of the Blaisdell majority about the limitations of their decision.  Hughes, 
in particular, did not intend to eviscerate the constitutional protection of vested contract rights.”) 
103 W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934). 
104 Id. at 433. 
105 Id. at 434. 
106 Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1949). 
107 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934). 
108 Id. at 439. 
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about this “‘pure’ economic state of emergency, [which,] though relatively 
unknown before the twentieth century, is now invoked as a justification by 
both left- and right-wing governments seeking to pursue widely disparate 
economic policies.”109 
For contrast, the court has recognized public health as being a legitimate 
concern, and other obvious emergencies, like remedying the immediate nui-
sance of flooding, as permissible exercises of states’ police powers.110  However,  
“[u]nlike legislation for the preservation of health and moral welfare, most of 
which fit within a traditional notion of governmental responsibility, laws that 
sought to alter the allocation of economic resources, or otherwise subject vested 
contract rights to the exigencies of economic change, raised critical questions 
about the permissible scope of state regulation under the Contract[s] 
Clause.”111 
Under this framework, in order to fall within the emergency powers ex-
ception articulated by Blaisdell, the model law faces a few hurdles.  Although 
the holding in Blaisdell is an instance in which a law was seen as a valid ex-
ercise of states police powers and immune from a Contracts Clause chal-
lenge, it was based on the very tenuous, narrow, policy-driven exception to 
the rule.  And although Schwarcz’s model law has the general well being of 
the public at its core, the law is not necessarily serving those public safety 
and policy goals typically associated with the Contracts Clause.  Further, 
though the economic climate is difficult and getting worse, the law, if 
broadly applied, does not appear to be enacted pursuant to any single par-
ticular emergency.  Most importantly, the method of adoption here—a 
state-enacted law with procedures for restructuring—is not temporary.  
The fact that such questions even exist within this uncertain legal landscape 
suggests that perhaps Schwarcz’s model law may be subject to constitution-
al challenges, even if under this Blaisdell standard alone. 
B.  Contracts Clause Jurisprudence in a Historical Context 
The Court’s later opinions further this idea that the Constitution may 
be less tolerant of these economically centered, state-enacted statutes, since, 
“[i]f a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to 
spend the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the 
Contract[s] Clause would provide no protection at all.”112  Coupled with 
this fact, and as the socially-focused, policy-based decision in Blaisdell is evi-
dence of, “the value of precedent as a prediction of outcomes in contracts 
 
109 Kahan, supra note 93, at 1284. 
110 See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 484 (1905). 
111 Olken, supra note 91, at 545. 
112 U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977). 
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clause cases is questionable.”113  Strengthening this uncertainty is Contracts 
Clause jurisprudence, which, both before and after Blaisdell, is characterized 
more by unpredictability than Schwarcz’s proposal would lead his audience 
to believe.  Indeed, “conflicts between law and politics have frequently 
dominated the Court’s contracts clause jurisprudence, and as a result the 
treatment of precedent that masks the political choices of another time is 
misleading and confusing.”114  Court jurisprudence after Blaisdell suggests a 
less lenient approach to broadly applicable exceptions based on police pow-
ers, and especially economic exceptions, which paves a rocky path for the 
model law’s success.  A historical analysis of the Contracts Clause shows the 
fluctuating standards in the Court’s interpretation of the scope of the emer-
gency powers exception, but more importantly, that there is no uniform test 
to determine whether a Contracts Clause violation can be sustained.  As 
long as this uncertainty remains in American law, it may undermine any 
scenario in which two jurisdictions will voluntarily enact the model law, 
thereby defeating it as a feasible mechanism to restructure sovereign debt. 
At various points in its history, the Contracts Clause has been considered 
a dormant part of the Constitution, with some scholars noting, “few consti-
tutional provisions have had such a profound impact on American law and 
have undergone such a dramatic decline as the Contract[s] Clause.”115   His-
torically, the Contracts Clause developed in response to debt-relief laws, 
which frustrated the enforcement of contracts and threatened the rights of 
many property owners—its “original task was to restore stability” and sancti-
ty to these contracts.116  Because state protection towards contracts was con-
sidered inadequate, the Clause was incorporated into the Constitution at the 
Convention.  Though the circumstances surrounding its initial adoption and 
ratification were “shrouded in mystery,”117 which “highlights [its] inherent 
ambiguity,”118 it nonetheless served as “one of the only protections against 
state interference with contractual obligations.”119 
The Clause experienced a heyday in the Marshall Court, which treated 
it as a “muscular restraint on state authority,” before being more narrowly 
applied by Justice Taney, who used it more as a means of affording states 
more policymaking power.120  At first, the Contracts Clause was understood 
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as “primarily as a constraint on legislative impairment of private contracts—
that is, to prevent states from intervening on behalf of private debtors 
against their creditors.  Beginning with Fletcher v. Peck, however, the Su-
preme Court has made it clear the Contracts Clause protects public con-
tracts” as well.121   As a result of this broadening, the Clause now protected 
agreements between states and individuals as well as private contracts, and 
courts felt free in applying the Clause’s provisions to tax-exemption agree-
ments, grants of corporate charters, land grants, agreements between states, 
and state insolvency laws.122  The clause was narrowed, however, through 
the case of Ogden v. Saunders, in which the Supreme Court held that the 
Contracts Clause was directed at only laws that retroactively interfered with 
contracts,123 suggesting that the Clause was in place to protect rights that 
already existed, rather than expand or circumscribe the right to contract.124 
In the middle of the twentieth century, the Clause steadily declined, and 
the Court found no violations of the provision between 1941–1977, leading 
to the Court’s necessary insistence, by 1978, that “the Contract[s] Clause 
remains part of the Constitution.  It is not a dead letter.”125  Perhaps as a re-
sult of this, many litigants are “unsure of the scope of the scope of the 
Clause’s power,” yet its text presents a substantial barrier to any type of legis-
lation that impairs existing contractual modification, particularly the con-
tracts of those creditors that are modified without their consent.126  As men-
tioned earlier in this paper, the limits of the clause run up against the state’s 
inalienable police powers as first articulated in Stone v. Mississippi,127 powers 
that prohibit a state from contracting away its ability to protect those within 
its borders or to promote or protect the public commonwealth and economic 
activity within its borders, even if an exercise of such power impairs existing 
contracts.128  Later jurisprudence revealed that, although states have the abil-
ity to modify their own contracts, that power is not unlimited—state govern-
ments can impair their own contracts without violating the Clause if they in-
stitutionalize impairment is sufficiently justified by public policy goals.129 
Since U.S. Trust, impairment, on its own, is not enough for a sustainable 
violation., or in the inverse, states can create constitutionally-sound im-
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pairments on its citizens’ contracts.130  As a result, Contracts Clause claims 
are analyzed under a two-pronged test131 asking first whether a state’s law 
creates a substantial impairment of existing constitutional relationships.132   
If the court finds a substantial impairment, then it will next consider wheth-
er the impairment of a public contract was “reasonable and necessary to 
serve an important public purpose.”133  Courts ratchet up or down levels of 
legislative deference based on a number of factors, including whether the 
state is a party to the contract.134  For an example of this deference in prac-
tice, in Chicago Board of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago,135 the Seventh Circuit 
upheld an Illinois law that altered the relationship between landlords and 
tenants in Chicago.  However, the court was heavily influenced by a few 
factors not at issue here—the new law was to be applied prospectively ra-
ther than retroactively, and the court utilized lowered level of scrutiny be-
cause of the already heavy regulation in landlord-tenant law and the state 
not being a party to the contracts.136  As a result, for constitutional purpos-
es, it was rational to believe the law would lead to improved public health 
and welfare.  In instances in which the state is alleged to have impaired a 
contract to which it is a party, the court will give less deference to a legisla-
tive determination of reasonableness and necessity, “because the State’s 
self-interest is at stake.”137  Coupled with this fact, an exercise of the police 
power that retroactively affects preexisting contracts is further “scrutinized 
with suspicion,”138 leading to a compounding scrutiny that can make a 
state’s laws subject to a very high threshold. 
It is at this point in our analysis that the court’s “reasonable and neces-
sary” prong set out in U.S. Trust becomes important.139  In its opinion, the 
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Court found that the state’s “total” repeal of a covenant was a violation 
since a less drastic modification was feasible, and total repeal was therefore 
not necessary, especially since states will always have a reason to reduce 
their own financial obligations, even if the given reason is an “important 
public purpose.”140  Relying in part on its earlier El Paso holding, the Su-
preme Court used the expectations of the contracting parties as a basis for 
reasonability.141  If the changes in perception of the state are of “degree and 
not of kind,” then the impairments are unreasonable.142  This “reasonable 
and necessary” prong has inspired circuit splits and conflicting opinions,143 
with the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals employing 
their own variations of this prong, while the Second Circuit strictly applying 
the test from U.S. Trust.144  Most dangerously for Schwarcz’s model law, the 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits give very little deference to state legislatures, and 
construe their tests to further what they believe is the “spirit” of U.S. 
Trust—resulting in continued invalidation of state action in a Contracts 
Clause context.145 
Some courts maintain that this dual standard, which places increased 
scrutiny on public contracts, is misguided, particularly the Seventh Circuit, 
who has held that “when a state repudiates a contract to which it is a party 
it is doing nothing different from what a private party does when the party 
repudiates a contract,” and correctly adds that “it would be absurd to turn 
every breach of contract by a state or municipality into a violation of the 
federal Constitution.”146  As this is the case, the crucial question becomes 
whether or not the plaintiffs under Schwarcz’s law retain the right to recov-
er damages for the breach of contract.  If the state’s repudiation of its obli-
gation extinguishes its duty to pay damages, then it will have impaired the 
obligation of contract.  A plaintiff would have to contend that they are 
barred from recovering damages from the State as a result of the State’s 
amendment of their bond contracts.147 
At any rate, the lack of uniformity between federal circuits is a concern, 
and the fact that U.S. Trust has created such a lack of guidance that those five 
different circuits read its holding differently does not promote the legal feasi-
bility of Schwarcz’s law.  Instead, it raises a question about whether a state—
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even New York, which has a great interest in the proceedings—would enact 
such a law before the circuit split is resolved by the Supreme Court. 
C.  State Authority to Enact a Subnational Insolvency Law 
Putting Contracts Clause challenges aside, a second, almost equally im-
portant constitutional issue arises regarding the authority under which a 
state could enact a restructuring or insolvency law on a subnational level.  
Though Schwarcz only lightly addresses this topic (“New York’s enactment 
of the model law should represent an exercise of New York’s police powers, 
a quintessential state responsibility”),148 he frames it in a Contracts Clause 
context.  Perhaps a more logical move would be to justify the law’s enact-
ment under the Bankruptcy Clause of the federal constitution, which has 
long been considered a source of congressional power.149  The Constitution 
overtly grants Congress the authority to regulate bankruptcy through this 
often-ignored provision.150  This Clause is a particularly appealing basis for 
enactment since the only times the Supreme Court has found an already-
enacted bankruptcy law to exceed Congress’s power were in narrowly ap-
plicable cases, such as those that applied to only a single debtor, and there-
fore this constitutional provision should be read as one that expands power 
rather than limits it.151 
However, a historical approach analyzing both existing and defunct 
American debtor laws in the United States shows how state innovation in 
the bankruptcy arena can experience disfavor and hostility by the courts, 
and the history of court decisions that led to the modern understanding of 
the bankruptcy clause serve are evidence of the constitutional questions that 
a subnational restructuring law would entail.152  Subnational insolvency 
laws that apply only to one given state may not be constitutional generally 
speaking, especially under the modern understanding of the Bankruptcy 
Clause.  To the extent that it is considered in modern constitutional schol-
arship, the Clause is viewed as part of a Hamiltonian effort, especially when 
paired with the Commerce Clause and the Contracts Clause to work, to 
operate federally and keep the states from piecemeal regulation.153 
Early bankruptcy laws, which were on occasion enacted on state levels, 
were responses to financial crises.  For instance, The Supreme Court’s 1819 
decision in Sturges v. Crowninshield154 struck down a New York bankruptcy 
 
148 Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 15 n.72. 
149 Lubben, A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 319, 353, 410, 
411 (2013). 
150 U.S. CONST.. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
151 Lubben, supra note 149, at 411. 
152 Id. at 410. 
153 Lubben, supra note 149. 
154 14 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). 
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law under the Contracts Clause, and serves a seminal case showing that 
states did not have full authority to enact bankruptcy laws applying solely to 
debtors within their jurisdictions.  Instead, such power skews more federal-
ly, with the purpose of maintaining uniformity in insolvency proceedings 
for debtors across state lines.155 
All said, Lubben’s article and analysis lead to a conclusion that “[b]ased 
on current precedents, the [Bankruptcy] Clause allows for a strong federal 
power over all types of creditors . . . subject only to a weak internal re-
quirement of uniformity.”156  In other words, an insolvency law that is not 
in violation of the Bankruptcy Clause may need be one that can apply in-
terstate, and allow for uniform treatment for creditors.  Though it seems 
easy enough, this would present issues for Schwarcz’s model law, as its cur-
rent inception applies solely to the bonds held within New York’s own ju-
risdiction, and for those creditors contained within that state’s jurisdiction.  
Enacting the model law across multiple state lines may offer a solution is 
still a possibility, but as the vast majority of the restructured bonds would be 
held in New York, it seems unlikely that another state would be compelled 
to consider passing the law at all. 
D.  Continuing Difficulties with Liquidation Analysis and Unconstitutional Contract 
Impairment 
This is not to say that every subnational, state-enacted insolvency law is 
preempted or barred by the Bankruptcy Code, as those instances under 
which Congress does not exercise its constitutional bankruptcy power, 
states may enact laws addressing debtors’ rights, so long as they “do not un-
constitutionally impair contractual obligations.”157  This was firmly estab-
lished in the Supreme Court case Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury 
Park, in which a state law restructuring of city debt was seen as constitution-
ally permissible.  Taking place prior to the enactment of the federal adop-
tion of the bankruptcy code, this state law restructurings was permissible.158  
Here, the court reasoned that the city’s restructuring was commenced in 
New Jersey state court prior to there being a federal bankruptcy alternative 
in existence at the time.159 
Obviously, since a federal restructuring law for municipalities now exists 
through Chapter 9 of the Code,160 the above case, which addresses a city’s 
 
155 See Lubben, supra note 149, at 319 (“Congress’s powers regarding insolvency were simply to im-
pose uniformity”). 
156 Id. at 410. 
157 Martin J. Bienenstock & Andrea G. Miller, Analyzing the Contracts Clause’s Impact on State Law Re-
structurings, N.Y. L.J. (Online), Sept. 14, 2015. 
158 See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942). 
159 Id. at 508. 
160 See 11 U. S. C. § 9. 
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restructuring, would face a preemption argument today.  However, because 
a similar federal mechanism does not exist for a sovereign state, then under 
this analysis a state’s sovereign debt restructuring law would not be uncon-
stitutional on its face.  Instead, it would need to be analyzed in the same 
fashion as those restructuring laws that exist independently of federal insol-
vency laws—most notably, those for insurance companies and other 
banks.161  In the United States, “[i]nsurance company insolvencies are not 
handled under the Bankruptcy Code but are governed by state insurance 
receivership laws and regulations.”162 
In an insurance and state banks legislation context, the Contracts 
Clause does not function as a strict bar for those states seeking to pass re-
structuring laws addressing these debt obligations, but serves mainly as a 
prohibition against those kinds of legislation that “materially reduc[e] the 
value of a contractual obligation” in the absence of a police power excep-
tion.163   Under this reasoning, a state is permitted to enact some legislation 
that could restructure the debt of entities such as banks and insurance com-
panies so long as the law preserves, for creditors, the values that they can 
obtain enforcing such entities’ obligations.164  “The recurring theme in the-
se decisions is that the value of the contractual obligation is not unconstitu-
tionally impaired if the creditors receive at least what they would receive if 
they enforced their claims.”165 
Similar to these insurance and state bank insolvency laws, sovereign 
debt restructuring mechanisms, even those enacted on a statewide level, 
would probably not be wholly prohibited by the Bankruptcy Clause, which 
is silent on the topic.  However, the larger issue is a persisting Contracts 
Clause challenge that arises when attempting to prove that a creditor would 
receive just as much value for his/her claims in a restructuring as he/she 
would in liquidation.  This cannot be shown for a sovereign, as it cannot 
have a typical liquidation in the way that a corporation could, through ex-
haustive asset sales. 
This highlights a key constitutional distinction: one between permissible 
debt enforcement laws and those laws discharging debtors from maintain-
ing their debts on their after-acquired property.166  A constitutional state 
restructuring law that addresses only corporations or similar entities can al-
low those corporation-debtors to liquidate through selling assets and leaving 
 
161 See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr. The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 723, 727–32 (1998) (discussing the multitude and divergences of state and federal banking 
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a shell after distributions to creditors, and such a law can exist with the sole 
purpose of organizing debt payment without permitting a discharge.  For 
an individual seeking restructuring under a similar law, such sales processes 
does not exist, and any future acquired property would need to be dis-
charged from existing debts.167  As a result, creditors’ rights are always im-
paired in the case of personal discharges from debt, as “in the absence of 
property the personal obligation to pay constitutes the only value of the 
debt.”168   In this respect, a sovereign is like an individual, as a restructuring 
would necessarily need to take the place of a discharge, rather than liquida-
tion, and places debtor-states into the same murky constitutional territory. 
IV.  POSSIBLE COUNTERARGUMENTS TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES 
This section seeks to further engage with the legal feasibility of the mod-
el law in a hypothetical scenario, particularly if the model law is passed by 
New York.  Proponents of the law would likely raise two arguments—first, 
that even if creditors sought recourse against the state, they would have no 
legal mechanism to do so, and second, that if a court ever heard such a 
claim, the dire economic situation that necessitated the law’s enactment 
would overrule the interests of any creditors on policy grounds. Both of the-
se claims are explored in detail, and ultimately refuted, below. 
A.  Creditors Lack a Legal Mechanism for Enforcing Their Rights 
Even if repudiation of a bond is seen as entirely unconstitutional under 
the Contracts Clause, the question remains as to whether the bondholders 
have any prospect of a remedy—in particular, it seems unlikely that a state 
court would grant these unpopular bondholders any recovery against the 
very state the court sits in, and sovereign immunity for a state, coupled with 
the Eleventh Amendment’s penumbra, usually bars federal question suits 
predicated on the Contracts Clause.169  Despite this hurdle, there are cer-
tain avenues with which federal court suits could nonetheless continue.170 
The burden of proof in a Contracts Clause context is a significant ques-
tion, and in a typical case, it falls upon the party asserting the Contracts 
Clause violation, who will need to show that no reasonable interpretation of 
the facts would justify the exercise.171  A claim that state alteration of a debt 
contract’s payment terms violated the Contracts Clause is a federal claim 
 
167 See id. at 3. 
168 See Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 187–88 (1902) (internal quotation omitted). 
169 Johnson & Young, supra note 90, at 150. 
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under the Constitution, not a state contract claim.  “Commentators and 
judges generally agree that the Eleventh Amendment’s textual bar does not 
extend to federal question suits. . . . [and] federal courts may issue prospective 
relief—that is, injunctions and declaratory judgments—against state officers 
who are alleged to be acting in violation of the U.S. Constitution.”172  “This 
may permit certain challenges to IOU’s: a creditor might sue, for instance, 
to enjoin the issuance of IOUs that arguably impair the obligation of the 
underlying debt instruments.”173 
Unlike other constitutional violations, there is some dispute over whether 
claims for Contracts Clause violations can permissibly function procedurally 
as civil rights claims under § 1983,174 which allows for a procedural vehicle 
absent substantive law, including for federal Contracts Clause violations.175  
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “Section 1983 provides no 
basis to complain of an alleged impairment” and can be utilized in a Con-
tracts Clause only as a direct constitutional challenge—in other words, when 
a state has foreclosed the imposition of an adequate remedy for an estab-
lished impairment, but not as a means of indirectly claiming that the gov-
ernment is merely contravening the Constitution, even if that contravention 
led to a deprivation of rights typically protected by § 1983.176  In other 
words, the acts of the state would need to rise to the level of a constitutional 
impairment of obligation, rather than a mere breach of contract.177 
Practically speaking, if there is a Contracts Clause violation, there are 
questions concerning the remedy that a state employee would be entitled 
to.178  Even if the model law does amount to a Contracts Clause violation, it 
may not even matter, since the creditors will likely be left without a remedy, 
thus disincentivizing them to bring a lawsuit. Creditors and beneficiaries 
will then remain unable to force actual payment on the original debtor or 
obligation, as the general structure of state sovereign immunity law is de-
signed to prevent courts from compelling payment on debts that threaten 
 
172 Johnson & Young, supra note 90, at 135–36. 
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the financial viability of the states.179  Further, “[t]he Supreme Court has 
interpreted [the Constitution] to impose significant constraints on retroac-
tive legislation affecting property rights” yet “paying some state obligations 
by short-term IOUs, however, may well be insufficiently serious to trigger 
those protections.”180 
That being said, “the law rarely cuts off all remedies,”181 and this, cou-
pled with the fact that creditors currently engage in holdout behavior at the 
detriment of their fellow creditors shows how tactics in a restructuring con-
text may not be based entirely in logic or payoffs.  If an arguable vehicle for 
a lawsuit exists, and creditors can arguably take advantage of it, then there 
is some member of a group of creditors who will likely attempt to utilize it.  
Especially since, as this paper has shown, there are, at the very least some 
questions about the constitutionality of this particular model law.  As a re-
sult, these threats of unconstitutionality can call into serious question the 
willingness of governments outside of New York to enact such a law.  Par-
ticularly in the United States, in the case of an actual insolvency, these con-
stitutionality concerns would have the potential to undermine the practical 
benefits of the model law.  If creditors would always raise an unconstitu-
tionality argument, such a law would likely not be adopted on a national or 
subnational level before it has the opportunity to be tested, and approved, 
by the Supreme Court. 
B.  Courts Should Strike Down Creditor Claims on Policy Grounds 
Though opponents may disagree, on policy grounds it is hard to main-
tain that the constitutional questions would weigh in favor of the state pas-
sage of the restructuring law.  Instead, a questioning court should correctly 
recognize how the emergency powers exception is one of many examples of 
“extra-constitutional responses to economic crises” that “may ultimately 
degrade liberty interests more than extra-constitutional responses to violent 
crises.”182  Because those factors present during economic crisis—and in 
governmental solutions to economic crisis—tend to provoke judicial re-
sponses that gradually integrate into non-emergency constitutionalism, 
there is a greater danger that emergency-based encroachments on econom-
ic liberty will become entrenched in our legal system than those emergency-
based encroachments on civil liberty.183   Thus, it is important to consider 
these more subtle encroachments of federal power on economic liberty, and 
prevent them when they appear contested in a courtroom. 
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Further, a competing policy argument weighing in favor of opponents to 
the law is an originalism one, which would ultimately lead to a strengthening 
of the Contracts Clause.  If courts are able to have unlimited reign to judge 
the “necessity” of contracts, this may run afoul of the original intent of the 
Framers, who clearly intended the goal of the Clause to promote stability for 
both the state and private parties entering a contract.184  The Contracts 
Clause was originally concerned with individualized credit laws, and sought 
to prevent inconsistent and unstable commercial transactions.185  The Fram-
ers, as expressed through ratification of the Clause, believed that fairness was 
inherent only in the bargaining process, and allowing states to effectively ab-
rogate this process would result in discord.186  As the law is constantly in flux 
and subject to questions about whether it is a dead letter, when one of these 
cases arises in a courtroom it is in the judge’s best interest to affirm its pow-
er, and the intent of the Framers, through his or her ruling. 
V.  TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE: A LAW OF 
RECOGNITION 
Rather than having New York adopt the law wholesale, the state may 
be able to adopt a law of recognition, one that says that New York will rec-
ognize a foreign sovereign debt restructuring, but under certain criteria that 
would make it comport with the emergency powers exception.  This will 
especially be true if England is able and willing to adopt the law on its 
own—although this would result in the fading of New York law in the in-
ternational monetary arena.  This law of recognition may also limit the 
standing of creditors to bring suit, including under a 1984 claim as ex-
pressed above, since the state would not be the one impairing their claims. 
Of course, a problem with a law of recognition is one of plausibility—
why would any state or subnational entity pass a law of recognition without 
any real interest in the restructuring of the debts of anther sovereign na-
tion?  This idea of support and recognition by U.S. subnational becomes all 
the more unlikely when considering how prevalent English law, at the ex-
pense of American law, would become internationally. 
Further, there is a legal question that persists for Contracts Clause pur-
poses about whether recognizing a foreign judgment can functionally serve 
as a constitutional workaround.  Seeing as New York would be refusing to 
enforce New York law contracts based on recognition of the English law, 
creditors could make a plausible argument that even a recognition obliga-
tion in this context, though it is one step removed from state level courts, 
might nonetheless violate the clause.  A law of recognition functions to di-
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rectly enforce foreign judgments as domestic ones,187 and though “recogni-
tion” differs from “enforcement,” the state is nonetheless seeking to domes-
ticate this judgment in the eyes of the U.S. Courts and treat it the same as 
other state decisions that benefit from Full Faith & Credit.188  Functionally 
speaking, the recognition is serving to produce the same effect and have the 
same authority as a case originally decided in the subnational jurisdic-
tion.189  This may undermine the state’s ability to pass a law recognizing 
such English judgments, as an enforcing U.S. court can only accept a for-
eign judgment when there is no reason why comity of the United States 
should not be given to the foreign judgment,190 and unconstitutionality of a 
restructuring under the Contracts Clause can certainly open a judgment up 
to the same challenges that it would receive if effected in a U.S. court.  
Though it creates a convoluted pathway and likely will exhaust certain 
creditors seeking enforcement, it is hard to see why, functionally, a subna-
tional law of recognition would substantively differ from the initial plan for 
a state sanctioned model law. 
CONCLUSION 
As recent international fiscal crises have shown, the issues of sovereign 
debt are of increasing importance, especially because of the interconnect-
edness of the financial markets and the bailout-driven “moral hazard” in-
centives.  Further, the contract-based approach results in inconsistencies 
and, even if radical changes and uniformity are brought about in CACs, the 
ultimate results are a long time away.  In the meantime, creditor states 
would still face real collective action problems.  In any event, the need for a 
consistent, predictable mechanism with which to restructure sovereign debt 
in the event of a default has become more of a necessity rather than the ac-
ademic thought experiment that it once was.  Of course, in the United 
States, the balance between constitutional rights and efficient, sustainable 
economic solutions will become a major factor, particularly when laws are 
implemented on a state level. 
As the wealth of legal scholarship leading to Schwarcz’s proposal has 
shown, the issue surrounding selecting the correct statutory mechanism is 
complicated, and designing the ultimate law even more so.  Although this 
paper is meant to show the benefits of choosing a statutory approach to sov-
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ereign debt, it is also meant to provide a map of some of the constitutional 
legal issues that can arise with a subnational statutory solution.  Hopefully, 
the issues and solutions that it offers are some that scholars and legislatures 
can incorporate into their future proposals, and therefore strengthen every-
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